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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(a) and 102(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: An appellate court gives the trial court a fair degree of deference when
reviewing the trial court's application of facts to the law of equitable estoppel. The court
of appeals applied such a standard of review. Should the Court overrule its prior
decisions to announce a new, less-deferential standard of review for equitable estoppel?
Standard of Review (Issue 1): The Imuses do not dispute that the appropriate
standard of review is to review for correctness.
Issue 2: Under Utah law, equitable estoppel has three well-established elements
requiring (i) an act that is inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable reliance;
and (iii) injury. The Bahrs have argued that when applying equitable estoppel to fix a
boundary there is an additional element requiring "permanent improvements/' but the
court of appeals held that improvements are considered within the existing injury element.
Was the court of appeals in error?
Standard of Review (Issue 2): The Court reviews the basic elements of
equitable estoppel under a standard of correctness. Bahr, 2009 UT App 155 at ^f 5 (citing
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 6, 177 P.3d 600). To the extent that the Bahrs' appeal
relates to the application of the facts, the trial court's decision is reviewed with a "fair
degree of deference." Bahr v. Imus, 2009 UT App 155, f 5, 211 P.3d 987 (quoting State
Dep 'L of Human Services ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997)).

Issue 3: Under Utah law, equitable estoppel has three well-established elements.
The Bahrs have argued that when equitable estoppel is applied to fix a boundary there are
additional elements for "wrongdoing" or "superior knowledge." The court of appeals held
that "wrongdoing" or "superior knowledge" are not required under Utah law. Was the
court of appeals in error?
Standard of Review (Issue 3): The Imuses do not dispute that an appellate court
will review a statement of the basic elements of equitable estoppel under a standard of
correctness. Bahr, 2009 UT App 155 at f 5 (citing Orvis, 2008 UT at ^ 6). To the extent
that the Bahrs' appeal relates to the trial court's application of the facts to such elements,
then, as argued below, the trial court's decision is reviewed with a "fair degree of
deference." Bahr, 2009 UT App 155 at f 5 (quoting Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678).
Issue 4: At the trial court level, the Imuses argued that summary judgment was
also appropriate under boundary by agreement. Because summary judgment was granted
based on estoppel, the trial court deferred ruling on boundary by agreement. If necessary,
the Court may affirm under boundary by agreement because it is undisputed that there
was an agreement as to an uncertain boundary, executed by construction of a fence. The
Bahrs argue that boundary by agreement requires (i) a long period of acquiescence and
(ii) "objective" uncertainty. Should the Court affirm under boundary by agreement?
Standard of Review (Issue 4): The Court reviews elements of a claim under a
standard of "correctness." Bahr, 2009 UT App 155 at % 5 (citing Orvis, 2008 UT at <k 6).
Preservation for Appeal (Issue 4): Boundary by agreement was argued to the

trial court in the briefing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 472-78;
658-63; 1058-67.) The trial court deferred ruling on boundary by agreement because it
held that the elements of boundary by estoppel were met. (R. at 1189.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Bahrs and Imuses own neighboring homes in Sandy, Utah. The Bahrs brought
this action, seeking to remove one of the Imuses' trees as a "nuisance" and claiming that
the boundary fence between the two properties was improperly located. The Bahrs claim
that the fence should be moved a few feet because of a slight discrepancy between the
platted description and the actual location of the fence, which was built in 1983. The
seek to leave the fence where it stands, asserting that the fence was built with the
agreement and help of their original neighbor, and that prior to initiation of this litigation,
the fence has always been treated as the boundary since 1983. The Imuses invested labor
and resources improving their side of the fence in reliance on their neighbors'
representations, and mature trees providing shade and privacy to the Imuses' backyard
would be destroyed if the fence is moved. Accordingly, title to the disputed parcel of
property is properly vested in the Imuses.
Proceedings Below
This action was initiated by the Bahrs on April 2, 2004 after an escalating dispute
over a Russian Olive tree growing on the Imuses' side of the fence. The Bahrs'
complaint asserts claims for private nuisance, slander, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, trespass, and quiet title. (R. at 1-12.) The Imuses filed for summary judgment on
these and the Bahrs' other claims on January 19, 2007. (R. at 215-216.) After the Bahrs
abandoned their claims for slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
trial court ruled that the Imuses were entitled to possession of the disputed parcel based
on boundary by estoppel. (R. at 1194.) Because this ruling disposed of the Bahrs5 claims,
the court did not rule on the Imuses' claim for boundary by agreement. (R. at 1189.)
The Bahrs appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, and the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court in all respects. Bahr v. Imus, 2009 UT App 155, 211 P.3d 987.
Statement of Facts
The Imuses first purchased their Sandy home in 1983. Because the subdivision
was new, the Imuses had not yet landscaped their yard or built a fence. Soon after
moving in, the Imuses met with their immediate neighbors, the Daltons on the east and
the Wymans on the west. All of the neighbors agreed to help build a fence. The Daltons
and Imuses split the cost of the fence on the eastern side of the Imuses' property between
them and built it together. Because the Wymans were short on cash at the time, the
Imuses agreed to fund the entire purchase of the materials for the western fence dividing
the backyards of the Imuses and Wymans, and the Wymans agreed to help with the labor
in locating and constructing the fence. (R. at 463-64; 223; 235; 271-79; 287-288)
Because it was not clear where the actual, platted boundary line was located, the
Wymans and the Imuses agreed that the fence they constructed would mark the boundary
between their respective properties. All of the neighbors participated in measuring, which

was geared towards making sure that there were 80 feet (as indicated on the plat) between
each of the fences, as opposed to precisely locating the true boundary line. The parties
knew that their measurements were not exact, but because each of the Daltons, Imuses,
and Wymans were satisfied that each had 80 feet, the marked fence line was agreed upon
as the boundary. (R. at 464; 218; 223; 276-79; 290-92.)
All of the neighbors then worked together to build the redwood fence. After the
fence was constructed, the Imuses began to plant trees and shrubs along their side of the
fence; they also installed an irrigation system and a koi pond. Over the years, the Imuses
continued to cultivate their yard, at considerable expense and with much hard work. As
the trees and shrubs matured, the Imuses were able to create a unique backyard with
sophisticated landscaping that provides both beauty and privacy, on which Imuses place
great value. (R. at 464-65; 229-30; 250-51; 261-65; 242-46.) (For convenience, pictures
of the Imuses' backyard, R. 237-246, are included in the Appendix.)
In 1985, the Wymans sold their home to Joe Carlisle. During Mr. Carlisle's
ownership, the Imuses and Mr. Carlisle continued to treat the fence as the boundary
between their respective properties. In 1988, Joe Carlisle sold to the Bahrs, the plaintiffs
in the present case. For many years, the relationship between the Imuses and the Bahrs
was cordial and friendly, and the parties performed neighborly tasks for each other like
collecting each other's mail while on vacation. (R. at 465; 230; 775.)
In September 2003, this relationship took an abrupt turn for the worse. One of the
trees that had been growing along the Imuses' side of the fence was a Russian Olive. The

Bahrs apparently did not like the tree and particularly took issue with the pods and leaves
that fell from the Russian Olive. So the Bahrs complained to the Imuses and requested
that the Imuses trim or remove the Russian Olive. The Imuses were not particularly tied
to this specific tree, and, as other trees and shrubs along the fence would still provide
adequate shading and privacy if the Russian Olive was removed, the Imuses, wanting to
ameliorate the concerns of their neighbors, consented to the removal of the tree. (R. at
466; 686-89; 717-18.)
The Bahrs, however, staunchly insisted that the Imuses pay for the removal of the
despised Russian Olive. This demand offended the Imuses' sense of fairness, as the
Imuses were perfectly happy with the Russian Olive remaining in their backyard and there
were no structural or safety issues related to the tree. A bitter dispute then ensued, with
multiple calls to the municipal authorities at Sandy City. (R. at 466; 230; 686-89.)
In the midst of this dispute, the Bahrs obtained a survey (the "Bahr Survey"),
which revealed a slight discrepancy in the platted boundary and the physical location of
the fence. At the front end of the fence, the Bahr Survey revealed a modest 0.2 foot (2.4
inch) discrepancy between the platted legal description and the fence. At the back end of
the fence, the Bahr Survey revealed a more cognizable 4.7 foot discrepancy. (R. at 656.)
Shortly thereafter, the Imuses obtained a survey themselves (the "Imus Survey"),
which also revealed a slight discrepancy. Strangely, however, the Bahr Survey and the
Imus Survey are not consistent. The Imus Survey shows a 1.12 foot discrepancy (greater
than the Bahr Survey) at the front end and a 4.37 foot discrepancy (less than the Bahr

Survey) at the back. (R. at 656.) The record is unclear whether the Bahrs contest that the
Bahr Survey or the Imus Survey represents the actual, platted boundary line. Whichever
survey line is used, the small, triangle shaped area contained between the platted line and
the fence is the real property subject to this dispute (the "Disputed Parcel").
The Bahrs then brought this action, seeking the removal of the Russian Olive as a
"nuisance" and claiming that the fence marking the boundary between the Bahrs' property
and the Imuses5 property was improperly located. In addition, the Bahrs also asserted
claims for slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (R. at 1-10.) During
the litigation, the Bahrs subpoenaed eight other neighbors on the street and conducted
depositions, in an effort to justify the Bahrs' claims for slander and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. (R. at 145-76; 1206,32:17-24.) When the Imuses moved for
summary judgment on these claims, the Bahrs did not even defend those claims in their
opposition brief. At oral argument, the Bahrs conceded that there was no basis to the
claims and stipulated to their dismissal. (R. at 1206, 32:14-19.)
Regardless of whether the Bahr Survey or Imus Survey is used, the actual distance
between the Imuses' east boundary fence and the west boundary fence is still 80 feet—the
same distance indicated on the plat map and the same distance as Jim Imus and Brent
Wyman measured it in 1983. If the fence were moved, the Imuses would lose almost five
feet of their property on the east (as the Imuses have no intention to sue their neighbors to
the east and likely would not prevail in such an action). (R. at 467-68; 561.)
Most importantly, moving the boundary at this point would not only require the

Imuses to incur significant expense, but would also cause long-term damage to their
backyard landscaping, as irrigation systems would have to be relocated, their storage shed
would have to be removed altogether, and they would lose virtually all of the
irreplaceable mature landscaping on the west side of their property. Removal of the
mature landscaping would eliminate the Imuses5 privacy and shade, and destroy the fruits
of the Imuses' many years of hard work and long hours devoted to beautifying and
improving their home. Such loss would be virtually impossible to mitigate at any
reasonable cost, as the mature growth on the west side of the Imuses' property has taken
over 20 years to cultivate, grow, and develop. (R. at 468; 231; 252.)
Sadly, Mr. Bahr has expressly testified that destroying this landscaping is one of
the motives in bringing this suit. (R. at 468; 731-32.) During discovery, the Bahrs also
admitted that, if successful in their suit, they would be getting more than they thought
they were getting at the time they purchased their property. (R. at 732, 33:9-13.)
Response to the Bahrs' Statement of Facts
There are multiple misstatements and mischaracterizations in the Bahrs' statement
of the facts, as detailed in the Imuses' original responses. (R. at 1042-58.) These issues,
however, are not relevant to the present appeal (except as discussed below with regard to
the alternative groundings for affirming). As the trial court stated, the trial court made its
decision "only on the undisputed facts." (R. at 1186.) It further noted that additional
facts, to which there might be a dispute, "are not material to the Court's resolution of the
case." (Id.) The trial court's summary of the undisputed facts is concisely stated in its

Memorandum Decision. (R. at 1186-88.) The Bahrs have not appealed any of the trial
court's findings of the undisputed facts. And, even if they had appealed such findings,
they have not marshaled the evidence with respect to any finding of an undisputed fact
which they contest. See Rules App. P. 24(a)(9).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court held that the Bahrs were estopped from contesting the boundary line
that was agreed-upon in 1983 and that has been evidenced by a fence ever since. The trial
court's decision was eminently reasonable, recognizing a fair arrangement between
cooperative neighbors and protecting over twenty years of investment and sweat equity in
landscaping a residential backyard. The trial court was well within its discretion in
applying its equitable powers to reach this result. The court of appeals affirmed with a
sound and well-reasoned opinion, and the Court should now affirm the court of appeals.
The Bahrs initially contend that the court of appeals employed an improper
standard of review. Because application of equitable estoppel presents a mixed question
of law and fact, the court of appeals gave the trial court a "fair degree" of deference. This
standard is based on well-established precedent from this Court, and the Bahrs fail to
present any compelling argument that the rule should be overruled.
The Bahrs next contend that the elements of equitable estoppel should be
expanded to include separate requirements for a permanent improvement and/or
wrongdoing and/or superior knowledge. The elements of equitable estoppel have been
concisely articulated as "(i) a failure to act that is inconsistent with a claim later asserted;

(ii) reasonable action taken on the basis of the failure to act; and (iii) injury would result
from allowing a repudiation of such failure to act." Dahllnv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT
App 391, TI14, 101 P.3d 83 (internal quotation and citation omitted); Bahr v. Imus, 2009
UT App 155, f 6. The Bahrs fail to present any compelling argument on why these
elements should be expanded.
First, Utah law does not require a separate showing of permanent improvements.
Instead, Utah law requires that a party take reasonable action and that there is an "injury"
which would result; these elements more than adequately encompasses the concept of
improvements. Furthermore, there is no need to impose such a requirement, which would
unnecessarily narrow the doctrine of equitable estoppel to restrict injuries justifying
estoppel solely to the loss of "permanent improvements." Moreover, even if there were
such a requirement, the trial court correctly ruled that the Imuses installed permanent
improvements when they constructed the fence, put in an irrigation system, and planted
what are now mature shrubs and trees.
Second, Utah law does not have a separate requirement for wrongdoing and/or
superior knowledge. Once again, the Bahrs mistake factors that may be considered in
some cases for separate and mandatory elements. While wrongdoing or superior
knowledge could conceivably form the basis for an estoppel, there is no Utah case where
such a factor was stated as a required element. To the contrary, Utah cases applying the
doctrine have held that equitable estoppel is properly invoked in circumstances that
involve neither wrongdoing nor superior knowledge. The court of appeals therefore

correctly ruled that these are not required as separate elements.
Finally, if, for any reason it is necessary, the Court can, and should, affirm the trial
court's ruling based on the doctrine of boundary by agreement, which provides that
"when the location of the true boundary line between two adjoining tracts of land is
unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, by parol agreement, establish
the boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and their grantees.5' Hummel
v. Young, 265 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1953). The undisputed facts presented to the trial
court demonstrate that the Imuses and the Wymans established just such a "boundary by
agreement," which is binding upon the Bahrs.
The Bahrs have now subjected the Imuses to years of expensive and burdensome
litigation over a trivial amount of land, the purpose of which can only be to destroy the
Imuses' landscaping, which the Bahrs contest is unsightly overgrowth. The journey has
included extensive and unnecessary discovery, including multiple depositions of
neighboring landowners in an effort to justify claims that the Bahrs later abandoned, as
well as two appeals. It is time for this saga to end.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED A DEFERENTIAL
STANDARD OF REVIEW TO THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION OF
THE FACTS AND NO CHANGE IN THE LAW IS WARRANTED.
The Court has explained that "while we generally consider de novo a trial court's
statement of the legal rule, we often review with far less rigor the court's determination of

the legal consequences of facts." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994). This is
because "with regard to many mixed questions of fact and law, it is either not possible or
not wise for an appellate court to define strictly how a legal concept is to be applied to
each new set of facts." State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^ 22, 144 P.3d 1096. Id. Not
surprisingly, a broad degree of discretion is afforded when equitable determinations are
reviewed. See, e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998) (giving broad discretion
in context of unjust enrichment); Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, \
11, 12P.3d580(same).
It is well established that determinations of equitable estoppel are given a broad
degree of discretion. State Dep't. of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d
676, 678 (Utah 1997). In Irizarry, the Court described equitable estoppel as "a classic
mixed question of fact and law." Id. (emphasis added). The Court further explained that
"equitable estoppel is simply stated, yet it is applicable to a wide variety of factual and
legal situations. The variety of fact-intensive circumstances involved weighs heavily
against lightly substituting our judgment for that of the trial court." Id. Because of these
concerns, the Court held that "we properly grant the trial court's decision a fair degree of

deference." Id. The discretion afforded is broad, and "an appellate court will not
overturn the trial court's application of equitable estoppel absent an abuse of discretion."
Irizarry., 945 P.2d at 680 (internal quotations omitted). And the rule has been applied
specifically in the context where a boundary has been fixed by application of equitable
estoppel. Bahr, 2009 UT App 155 at % 5 (quoting Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678); see also
Dahllnv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, f 8, 101 P.3d 830. ("We grant... broadened
discretion to the trial court on the issue of equitable estoppel.") (quoting Trolley Square
Assocs. v. Nielson} 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)).
The Bahrs do not dispute that the basic rule set forth in Irizarry and numerous
other Utah cases is controlling. Rather, the Bahrs argue that the Dahl and Bohr courts
erred in granting deference pursuant to Irizarry because in this particular case the doctrine
of equitable estoppel was employed to fix a boundary. Based on this distinction, the
Bahrs argue that Irizarry should be disregarded and the Court should instead undertake a
new Pena analysis to establish an independent standard of review for cases where
equitable estoppel is used to fix a boundary.
This argument should be rejected. Despite similar invitations to do so in the past,
this Court has declined to undertake a new Pena analysis to create separate standards of
review for each of the various contexts in which equitable estoppel might be applied. See
Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678. Apart from the mere fact that the application of equitable
estoppel in this case resulted in the fixing of a boundary, the Bahrs offer no substantive

reason why the Court should depart from this precedent, and the Court should accordingly
decline to do so.
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept the Bahrs' invitation to undertake a
new Pena analysis to determine the appropriate standard of review for cases where
equitable estoppel results in the fixing of a boundary, a "fair degree of discretion" would
still be the resulting standard. The factors to be considered pursuant to the Pena/Levin
analysis are as follows:
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is
to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule
relies on "facts" observed by the trial judge, "such as a witness's appearance
and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately
reflected in the record available to appellate courts;" and (3) other "policy
reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts."
Levin, 2006 UT 50 at ^ 25 (quoting State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, % 28, 137 P.3d 787).
Each of these factors militates in favor of upholding the well established precedent of
affording the trial court a "fair degree of discretion" in equitable estoppel cases.
A.

The Degree of Variety and Complexity of Facts in Applying a Trial
Court's Equitable Powers Strongly Favors Appellate Deference.

The present case presents exactly the situation in which deference is warranted.
As discussed above, the Court's prior decisions uniformly treat equitable estoppel as a
highly fact-dependent inquiry justifying a broad degree of deference. Accordingly, this
factor weighs heavily in favor of deference. See also Levin, 2006 UT 50 at 1 24
("Discretion is broadest—and the standard of review is most deferential—when the
application of a legal concept is highly fact dependant and variable.").

The Bahrs have not presented any meaningful argument to rebut the basic
contention that equitable estoppel, even when applied to fix a boundary, is highly factdependent. In fact, the Bahrs even admit that this "is a fact dependant analysis and surely
the facts relevant to such determination will vary form case to case." (Appellants' Br. at
19.) Instead, the Bahrs rest on the bald conclusion that "the facts expected from these
determinations, unlike equitable estoppel claims in general, are not so complex and
varying that no rule can be spelled out." (Id.) But the Bahrs do not discuss such facts.
Indeed, comparison to the case on which the Bahrs exclusively rely in support of
this argument, Levin, demonstrates the weakness of their argument. In Levin, the Court
pointed to the "objective" nature of custodial interrogation and held that "the relevant
facts are typically not particularly complex and can usually be identified with specificity."
2006 UT 50 at 129. For example, the Court discussed (i) the ability to identify the
location of interrogation in the record; (ii) the intuitive significance of such a location;
(iii) the length of the interrogation as an objective quantity which can be compared to
other circumstances; and (iv) the objective character of the indicia of arrest, such as
"handcuffs, drawn guns, locked doors, threats, or coercion are present." Id.
The Bahrs have not pointed to any objectively determinable facts or identified
repetitive fact patterns that would form the basis of workable rules of general application
of equitable estoppel to fix a boundary, nor can they. The universe of facts possibly
implicated in weighing the equities in such cases is far too vast to make them predictable.
As the Court has previously explained, equitable estoppel is a highly fact dependant

inquiry which ccweighs heavily against lightly substituting [the Court's] judgment for that
of the trial court.'5 Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678.
B.

While the Second Factor Is Not as Relevant the Trial Court's
Proximity to the Facts Also Supports Appellate Deference.

The Bahrs' argument that the Court should disregard Irizarry and engage in a
separate Pena analysis in this case is based on their contention that a different standard
should apply in all cases where equitable estoppel is used to fix a boundary. Accordingly,
the proper inquiry in applying the second Pena factor is "the degree to which a trial
court's application of the legal rule relies on 'facts' observed by the trial judge" in the
typical case of this type. In the usual case the trial court will undeniably be in a position
to observe the crucial facts; thus, this factor weighs in favor of affording deference.
In an effort to avoid this conclusion, the Bahrs improperly attempt to shift the
analysis from consideration of the typical cases to which the rule would apply, to
discussion of only the unique circumstances of this case. Specifically, the Bahrs argue
that the second prong of the Pena analysis militates in favor of a less deferential standard
of review in all cases where equitable estoppel results in the fixing of a boundary,
because, in this specific case, the trial court found and relied upon undisputed facts.
The Court has specifically considered and rejected such arguments. In Desert
Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, 12 P.3d 580, the trial court dismissed the
defendant's unjust enrichment claim based upon stipulated facts. 2000 UT 83 at ^f 18.
On appeal, the defendant argued for a standard of review "granting no discretion to the

district court's application of the law to the facts in this case because the parties stipulated
to the facts." Id. at \ 11. The Court flatly rejected this argument, explaining that
[although the district court did not have the opportunity to "observe" the
stipulated facts, it did have adequate opportunity to become fully acquainted
with the facts.
Id. at f 12. This ruling is consistent with numerous other Utah decisions.1 Even where
the facts are not disputed, the trial court is in a position to become intimately familiar with
all of the underlying facts and procedural history of cases where estoppel is applied to fix
a boundary, and the second Pena factor therefore militates in favor of affording the trial
court a fair degree of deference.
C.

Policies Respecting the Trial Court's Ability to Weigh Equities in
Various, Unpredictable Fact Scenarios Strongly Support Giving
Deference.

Policy considerations support, rather than diminish, the need for appellate
deference on determinations of estoppel. Levin voiced some of the underlying policy
considerations. The Court noted that "over-involvement by an appellate court can lead to
confusing and inconsistent pronouncements of the law." 2006 UT 50 at % 22. And the
Court also recognized the desire to provide a trial court some comfort to "reach one of
several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without
risking reversal." Id. Circumstances justifying equitable relief are, by their nature, varied

1

See John Holmes Const., Inc. v. R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc., 2004 UT App. 392, % 9,
101 P.3d 833, rev'don other grounds (reviewing grant of summary judgment and
affording "broad discretion to the trial court"); Central Florida Investments, Inc. v.
Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, f 2, 20, 40 P.3d 599 (giving deference to determination
of waiver, when facts were undisputed).

and unpredictable, and too narrow of review would unnecessarily hamstring trial courts
and chill the trial court's willingness to exert its equitable powers. A healthy degree of
discretion mitigates these concerns. Accordingly, granting deference on equitable
estoppel determinations makes good policy sense.
In asking for a reversal of existing precedent, the Bahrs rely on a single policy
argument, pointing to those "strong public policies relating to the ownership, possession,
protection, and transfer of real property." (Appellants' Br. at 23.) While land ownership
obviously implicates important public policies, the Bahrs' contentions do not warrant a
change in the standard of review for equitable estoppel.
First, the Court has already implicitly rejected the Bahrs' argument in Jeffs v.
Stubbs. There, the Court considered much more substantial real property interests than
the de minimis boundary discrepancy in this case. Jeffs involved a major dispute seeking
to resolve the rights to occupy and ownership of improvements, namely homes, on entire
parcels of land. 970 P.2d at 1239-40. Despite these substantial real property interests, the
Court had no problem applying a Pena analysis and deciding to "afford broad discretion
to the trial court." Id. at 1245. In fact, the Court, in discussing the policy factor,
specifically stated that "[t]his factor seems weak in this case." Id.
Second, the Bahrs do not appreciate the contours of the policy analysis required by
Levin. Nearly every issue brought before the Utah Supreme Court implicates deep and
significant policy concerns. But the policy factor in the Pena/Levin analysis focuses
primarily on the need for uniformity and predictability in particular areas of law. See,

e.g., Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1245 ("[T]here are policy reasons requiring uniformity among trial
courts addressing these issues in similar fact circumstances.").
Levin provides a good example of the types of policy considerations that may
justify narrowing a trial court's discretion. The Court explained that "the published
decisions of appellate courts cprovid[e] state-wide standards that guide law enforcement
and prosecutorial officials/" Levin, 2006 UT 50 at «f 20 (emphasis added).
Clarity and consistency in our courts' application of the Miranda protections
will benefit the accused by offering predictable constitutional protections, and
it will benefit the State by providing better guidance to the police officers in
their administration of Miranda warnings.
Id. at Tf 41 (emphasis added). In short, a police officer needs to know when to give a
Miranda warning, because these are recurring fact patterns touching on federal
constitutional protections that have daily application. Such serious issues justify clear,
identifiable legal rules that provide predictability at the expense of discretion. While
there are surely important policy interests in property ownership, there is little utility in or
need for narrowing a trial court's discretion in the application of equitable estoppel to fix
a boundary. Unlike custodial interrogations, boundary disputes do not routinely arise, nor
are landowners likely to seek guidance in resolving such disputes from case law.
The court of appeals should be affirmed based on the well-established rule set
forth in Irizarry, Jeffs, Desert Miriahy Dahl, and numerous other Utah cases affording a
fair degree of deference. And if the Pena/Levin analysis were applied anew, for whatever
reason, the same conclusion follows.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY STATED THE ELEMENTS
FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL UNDER UTAH LAW.
Under established Utah law, the court of appeals correctly held that the elements

of equitable estoppel are "(i) a failure to act that is inconsistent with a claim later
asserted; (ii) reasonable action taken on the basis of the failure to act; and (iii) injury
would result from allowing a repudiation of such failure to act." Bahr v. Imus, 2009 UT
App 155, Tf 6, 211 P.3d 987; (quoting Dahl, 2004 UT App 391 at 1f 14). This statement is
consistent with every statement by this Court of the elements of equitable estoppel. See,
e.g., Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 681. ("The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of
equitable estoppel are: (1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the claim
afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement
or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act.").
Notwithstanding this clear weight of authority, the Bahrs contend that the court of
appeals erred because equitable estoppel requires an additional showing of "permanent
improvements" and/or "wrongdoing" and/or "superior knowledge." But the elements of
equitable estoppel are easily drawn from long-standing authorities, and the court of
appeals correctly stated the elements, as did Dahl and Irizarry and the multitude of other
cases listing the same three elements.
To the extent that the Bahrs' appeal is read to be a request for a change in existing
law, they have presented no compelling reason to make such a change. Although
boundary by estoppel is rarely employed, the Bahrs appear to argue that more restrictive

elements are needed to further limit its use, asserting that estoppel is generally
"disfavored" and "it is bad policy to employ estoppel in order to effectuate a transfer in
title of real property." (Appellants' Br. at 12.) But Utah authority does not "disfavor"
estoppel. As recognized by the court of appeals, "the doctrine of estoppel in the boundary
dispute context has been sanctioned in Utah to provide equitable title to property." Bahr
v. Imus, 2009 UT App 155, f 8. All of the boundary doctrines are based on important
policy considerations geared towards "avoiding litigation and promoting stability in landownership." Stoker, 785 P.2d at 423. Application of equitable estoppel in the boundary
context is a useful tool for dealing with difficult land use disputes in a fair and efficient
manner in the relatively narrow range of cases in which the requisite elements are met.
For these reasons, and as discussed more fully below, the court of appeals
correctly rejected the Bahrs' arguments as contrary to Utah law, and it is neither necessary
nor desirable for the Court to modify the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
A.

The Court of Appeals Correctly Ruled that the Imuses Satisfied the
Injury Element of Equitable Estoppel and that They Needed to Make
No Further Showing Regarding "Permanent Improvements."
1.

The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Does Not Require the Imuses
to Prove that They Made Permanent Improvements.

The court of appeals properly concluded that "permanent improvements are not a
separate element of equitable estoppel, but are required only insofar as they assist the
court in evaluating the 'reasonable action' and injury' elements." Bahr v. Imus, 2009 UT
at <|j 8. While Bahrs dispute this, they do not explain how, exactly, the court of appeals
erred in its discussion and analysis of Peterson v. Johnson, 34 P.2d 697 (Utah 1934),

Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P.2d 912 (Utah 1929), and Dahllnv. Co. v. Hughes. Rather, they
simply reiterate the same argument made at every stage of this litigation that permanent
improvements are required when equitable estoppel is applied in the boundary context,
relying on Peterson's statement that "no permanent improvements were placed on the
land in question and hence defendant is not in a position to invoke the doctrine of
equitable estoppel." 34 P.2d at 698.
The Court should reject the Bahrs' argument for the same reasons set forth by the
court of appeals. As the court of appeals explained, the referenced statement from
Peterson was mere dicta. Bahr, 2009 UT at ^f 7. The court correctly concluded that
Peterson in no way defined the elements of equitable estoppel, and that the statement
regarding permanent improvements was intended solely to indicate that there would be no
genuine injury if the true boundary line was enforced. Id. ^ 8. The court also correctly
held that Tripp v. Bagley, the only other Utah estoppel case that even mentions
"permanent improvements," should be read similarly, with the consideration of permanent
improvements tied to the determination of whether there would be "real injury." Id. .
As set forth in Dahl, equitable estoppel requires only that "injury" result if the
estopped party repudiates its act or failure to act. See Dahl, 2004 UT App at f 14. This
analysis makes it clear that the test is not whether the Imuses affixed a specific type of
"permanent" improvement on the disputed parcel, but whether or not the Imuses would be
injured if they had to move their fence and improvements. The court of appeals was
therefore correct in its determination that a showing of permanent improvements is not a

required element of boundary by estoppel, but is rather a piece of evidence that speaks to
the elements of reasonable reliance and injury.
To the extent that the Bahrs' arguments can be interpreted seeking a change in the
existing law, they have not presented any compelling reason such a change. As the court
of appeals explained, any policy considerations supporting a requirement for permanent
improvements are addressed in the other elements of estoppel, particularly in the
requirement for injury. And limiting "injury" to permanent improvements could result in
unfair outcomes, as there are significant injuries which might not necessarily constitute an
improvement. The present circumstances offer just one example: if the Bahrs were
successful, the permanent loss of five feet on Imuses5 eastern boundary line would
represent a significant injury, as the Imuses likely cannot now legally recover this
property. In sum, there is no reason to restrict cognizable injuries solely to the loss of
permanent improvements, as the existing element for injury is adequately restrictive.
2.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Imuses Made
Permanent Improvements to the Disputed Parcel.

Even if "permanent improvements" were a necessary element of equitable estoppel
when applied in the boundary context, the trial court's award of summary judgment
would still be proper. The trial court cited Peterson and considered whether "permanent
improvements were placed on the land in question." (R. at 1189.) Based on the
undisputed facts, the trial court held that the Imuses made permanent improvements.
Three of the eight undisputed facts support such a conclusion. The trial court's
fact no. 4, 8 and 8 recognizes that "the Imuses proceeded to construct a redwood fence on

the agreed upon boundary line;" that "the Imuses installed improvements, landscaping
and irrigation systems on their side of the fence;" and that "[djuring this 20 or near 20
year period, the Defendants, in addition to installing a sprinkler system, landscaped the
property to their liking, which included admitted costs of improvements of $7,000 to
$9,000." (R. at 1187-88.) In its discussion, the trial court found that "the Imuses built the
fence as the property line marker and then installed improvements on the property such as
a shed, koi pond, and landscaping up to the fence line." (R. at 1190). It further found
that the Bahrs "did nothing to prevent the Defendants from maintaining and adding
further improvements, such as vegetation and fixtures to the property at issue." (Id.)
The trial court's findings are fully supported by the record. Significantly, in
contesting the trial court's determination of improvements, the Bahrs fail to marshal the
evidence with regard to such findings. Rules App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.").
Regardless, if the record is examined, there is more than adequate evidence for the Court
to affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment.
The original statement of facts sets forth that "[w]ithin weeks of the construction
of the Boundary Fence the Imuses constructed improvements on their property up to the
Boundary Fence. These improvements included landscaping, irrigation, and storage
sheds." (R. at 464; 229; 250.) The Bahrs did not dispute that such improvements exist;
they even admitted that "[t]he only improvement the Imuses may have made within a
short time after the Boundary Fence was installed is landscaping." (R. at 649.)

The Imuses further stated that "[mjoving the boundary at this point would not only
require the Imuses to incur significant expense, but would also cause them significant
inconvenience, as irrigation systems would have to be relocated, their storage shed would
have to be removed altogether, and they would lose virtually all of the irreplaceable
mature landscaping on the west side of their property" and that "[rjemoval of the
landscaping in the Disputed Parcel would eliminate the Imuses' privacy and shade, and
destroy the fruits of the Imuses many years of hard work and long hours devoted to
beautifying and improving their landscape. Such loss would be virtually impossible to
mitigate at any reasonable cost, as the mature growth on the west side of the Imuses5
property has taken over 20 years to cultivate, grow, and develop." (R. at 468; 231; 252.)
In response, the Bahrs simply asserted that "[t]here is no evidence whatsoever
about the cost or expense the Imuses would incur to relocate and remove irrigation
systems, a storage shed or the loss of mature landscaping." (R. at 654.) But such
evidence. In addition to the implicit investment of many Saturday afternoons working in
the backyard and the inherent value of mature trees, the Imuses offered evidence of the
cash investment made. Fact no. 8 in the original statement of facts sets forth that
[t]he landscaping installed by the Imuses is elaborate and costly. The Imuses
have a great love of nature, and selected their lot specifically because of the
view and the exposure to sunlight needed for planting. Over time the Imuses
have planted thousands of plants including annuals, perennials, trees and
shrubs, and even installed a high-quality built-in koi pond, all in an effort to
attract birds and create a natural, secluded environment. The total estimated
costs for these improvements is in excess of $30,000.00.
(R. at 464-65; see also R. at 229-30; 250-51.)

In response , the Bahrs argued that the "landscaping, at least in the opinions of
Plaintiffs, is overgrown, unkept, and trashy." (R. at 650 (citing depositions of Bahrs).)
Such argument is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact, and the Bahrs even
admitted that "the total value of improvements to the disputed portion of property is no
more than $7,000 to $9,000." (R. at 650.) The Imuses have also produced receipts for
materials to build the fence and landscaping. (R. at 991-1019.) And Melodee Imus
estimated that the economic cost to replace the improvements "is in excess of $15,000."
(R. at 890.) The evidence overwhelmingly supports the trial court's findings.
To the extent that the Bahrs argue that the trial court improperly applied such
undisputed facts, the Bahrs cite little Utah law on the definition of "permanent
improvements." Even so, the Imuses easily meet the definition offered by the Bahrs. The
Bahrs contest that Utah cases "suggest that to be of a permanent nature, an improvement
must be substantial and must increase the usefulness of the property." (Appellants' Br. at
33.) The evidence discussed above establishes that the improvements are substantial and
increase the usefulness of the property.
The Bahrs' argument to the contrary rests primarily on the contention that
landscaping cannot, per se, constitute a permanent improvement. The Bahrs contend that
other "states have determined that permanent improvements must be more substantial
than planting trees, shrubs, flowers, and grass." (Appellants' Br. at 33.) The North
Carolina cases cited for this proposition are unpersuasive, as both deal specifically with
the dedication of public streets. Town of Oriental v. Henry, 678 S.E.2d 703, 709 (N.C.

Ct. App. 2009) ("[W]here a portion of a dedicated street is accepted, the unaccepted
portion remains dedicated to public use."); City of Salisbury v. Earnhardt, 107 S.E. 2d
297, 300 (N.C. 1959) ("Moreover, G.S. § 1-45 provides as follows: cNo person or
corporation shall ever acquire any exclusive right to any part of a public road, street, lane,
alley, square or public way of any kind by reason of any occupancy thereof or by
encroaching upon or obstructing the same in any way.5").
Other cases cited by the Bahrs are equally unpersuasive. The Bahrs' best cases
simply stand for the proposition that improvements which are easily moved do not justify
an estoppel. See Marhenholz v. Alff, 112 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Iowa 1962) (declining to
apply estoppel when plaintiff could easily remove patio brick laid in sand, flowers, and
bushes); Gorbics v. Close, 722 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to
apply estoppel when there was no evidence that mobile home could not be moved). Other
cases cited by the Bahrs simply suggest that preliminary or superficial work does not
justify estoppel. See Downing v. Boehringer, 349 P.2d 306, 309 (Idaho 1960) ("The ditch
is a small irrigation lateral constructed with tractor and plow, and no showing was made
of the expense involved."); Dart v. Thompson, 154 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Iowa 1967) (declining
to apply estoppel for benefit of aggressive neighbor when there was "nothing more than
the digging of some shallow trenches and placement of some footing.").
These cases are not analogous to the present circumstances. Even if the Court was
persuaded that minimal landscaping is insufficient to support estoppel, the Bahrs fail to
explain why or how these results should be applied in a situation where vegetation was

allowed to mature for twenty years, as this kind of mature growth is almost impossible to
reproduce and, if possible, would be prohibitively expensive. Landscaping is a valuable,.
useful, tangible, and permanent improvement.2 Indeed, entire industries, such as
landscaping companies and nurseries, exist because such improvements are valuable to
property owners.
Lastly, the Bahrs ignore other improvements made by the Imuses. The sprinklers
are an improvement. And the fence, itself, is a valuable and permanent improvement,
which, alone, satisfies any requirement for a permanent improvement. See Hogan v.
Swayze, 237 P. 1097, 1101 (Utah 1925) ("It must be conceded that any permanent
improvements, such as . . . fences . . . will enhance . . . the value of adjacent land.").
B.

Under Utah Law, Equitable Estoppel Does Not Have Separate
Requirements for Wrongdoing or Superior Knowledge.

The Bahrs also argue that in addition to the well-established elements repeatedly
identified in Utah case law, equitable estoppel additionally requires a showing of "actual
wrongdoing" and/or "superior knowledge." These arguments are contrary to Utah law,
and must be rejected.
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See Adamson Cos. v. City ofMalibu, 854 F. Supp. 1476, 1481 (CD. Cal. 1994)
(referring to landscaping as a "permanent" improvement); Greenland Homes, Inc. v. E &
S Marketing Resources, Inc. (In re Greenland Homes, Inc.), 227 B.R. 710, 716 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 1998) (same).
3
See also Grant v. Hipsher, 64 Cal.Rptr. 892, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (referring to fence
as "permanent" improvement); Williams v. Rogier, 611 N.E.2d 189, 195 (lnd. Ct. App.
1993) (same), over 'd on other grounds', Babin v. Babin, 433 So.2d 225, 226 (La. Ct. App.
1983) (same); Ex parte Askins, 356 S.E.2d 838, 838 (S.C. 1987) (same); In re Babb, 567
P.2d 599, 584 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (indicating that fence is "substantial" improvement).

1.

"Wrongdoing" Is Not a Required Element of Equitable Estoppel.

As their primary authority for the contention that wrongdoing is a mandatory
element of estoppel, the Bahrs cite Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28,
158 P.3d 1088. Again, the Bahrs repeat their prior arguments without even addressing
the reasoned discussion in the opinion by the court of appeals. First, as pointed out by the
court of appeals, Youngblood is inapposite, as it "discussed the differences between
equitable and promissory estoppel, and clarified that a misrepresentation as to the future
is generally required for application of promissory estoppel." Bahr, 2009 UT App 155 at
Tf 11. Most importantly, the Bahrs continue to cite to paragraph 15 of Youngblood, which
says nothing at all about wrongdoing, and instead states that "estoppel reflects
circumstances where it is not fair for a party to represent facts to be one way to get the
other to agree, and then change positions later to the other's detriment." 2007 UT 28.
The court of appeals quoted this language directly and then concluded that there is
"nothing in Youngblood requiring fraudulent, misleading, or unconscionable behavior by
the party sought to be estopped." Bahr, 2009 UT App 155 at \ 11. Inexplicably, the
Bahrs continue to cite Youngblood, without any discussion as to how the court of appeals
was mistaken.
Furthermore, Youngblood's statement of the basic elements is completely
consistent with DahV statement of the elements. Indeed, there is no mention of
wrongdoing; there need only be a "statement, act, omission, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted." Youngblood, 2007 UT 28, ^f 14. These are

exactly the circumstances in this case: when constructing the fence, the Imuses relied on
their neighbors' representations that the fence would be treated as the property line, and it
would therefore be unfair if the Bahrs are allowed to repudiate those representations.
The Bahrs' contentions are further contradicted by the fact that Utah courts have
repeatedly applied equitable estoppel in cases where there was clearly no "wrongdoing"
of the type the Bahrs claim is required. For example, in Dahl, the defendant poured a
cement driveway along a line the defendant believed marked the boundary between the
defendant and the plaintiffs property. Plaintiff thereafter asserted that the driveway
actually encroached, and the defendant invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id.
Despite the fact that there was no fraud or misrepresentation, the court held the plaintiff
was "estopped from asserting a claim to the property" simply because plaintiff had "failed
to notify [defendant] of its claim." Id. at ^[15. The plaintiff did not commit any
"wrongful" act; rather, his inaction alone formed the basis for estoppel.
Likewise, the plaintiff in Irizarry, after initially representing to the defendant that
she did not want and would not accept child support, later sought to recover
reimbursement equivalent to five years of back child support payments from the
defendant. Id. at 678. The defendant raised equitable estoppel, explaining that, based
upon the plaintiffs representations, he had married and started a family, and was
accordingly not financially capable of paying the back child support payments in addition
to the current child support payments. Id. at 681. Applying the same three elements, the
Court concluded that the trial court had correctly held that the defendant had "reasonably

changed his position in reliance on [the plaintiffs] representations" and that the plaintiff
should be estopped from now taking a position "inconsistent with" her earlier
representations. Id. Notably, there was no discussion, or assertion of any kind, that the
plaintiffs conduct had been "wrongful" in any manner.
The foregoing authority makes it plain that no affirmative "fraud or
misrepresentation" is required to apply estoppel. Moreover, to the extent the Bahr's
arguments are viewed as a request for the Court to modify the law to require such a
showing, such a modification is unjustified. The underlying thrust of Utah estoppel cases
is a focus on detrimental reliance as the cornerstone of the estoppel doctrine. See
Youngblood, 2007 UT 28,115; Stoker, 785 P.2d at 423 n.4. And the existing elements,
plainly stated, allow for such focus. Wrongful conduct by the party sought to be estopped
is not necessary to induce innocent reliance. Rather, it is the contradiction between the
original statement, which induces reasonable action taken in detrimental reliance, and the
subsequent claim that gives rise to the need for estoppel. The initial representation may
be well-intentioned but still result in detrimental reliance which supports estoppel. It is
the assertion of a later, inconsistent claim that is wrongful.
To the extent that the Bahrs' appeal can be read as disputing the trial court's
application of facts to the law, there was ample evidence, certainly more than in Dahl or
Irizarry, to support the first element of estoppel. Not only did the Wymans participate in
the measuring and construction of the fence, they affirmatively represented, prior to the
construction of the fence and the Imuses' subsequent improvements, that they would

agree to treat the fence as the boundary. Further, to the extent that the action of the Bahrs
is relevant, their conduct also supports application of estoppel. Like the plaintiff in Dahl,
except for a much longer period of time, they never took any action to prevent the Imuses
from using and improving the property on the Imuses' side of the fence. These
undisputed facts support estoppel.
2.

"Superior Knowledge" Is Not a Required Element of Equitable
Estoppel.

The Bahrs finally contend that equitable estoppel requires that the party to be
estopped have "superior knowledge" and "actual knowledge of the relevant facts."
(Appellants Br. at 44.) Utah law does not support this contention. Under Utah law, there
is no requirement for superior or actual knowledge, as the straightforward statement of
the elements contain no such requirement. Dahl, 2004 UT App 391 at ^| 14; Bahr v. Imus,
2009 UT App 155 at Tf 6; Youngblood, 2007 UT 28 at % 14. Indeed, the only Utah law
that the Bahrs can muster in support of their assertion is Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d
1113 (Utah 1985). But Barnard does not support the Bahrs' blanket contention.
In Barnard the court refused to enforce an oral land sales contract between a
mother and son because the legal description of the land to be conveyed was "too
indefinite to permit specific enforcement." 700 P.2d at 1115. The court further rejected
the son's claim that his mother should be estopped from claiming a deficiency in the
description, finding that the mother could not have made any misrepresentation upon
which the son relied because "[t]here is nothing in the record even implying that [the
mother] knew the contract was unenforceable because of a deficiency in the description

of the land." Id. at 1115-1116. In addition, since the son received a refund of his money,
he was not damaged and did not demonstrate any detrimental reliance. Id. at 1116.
Barnard in no way indicates that either wrongdoing or superior knowledge is a
necessary element of equitable estoppel. Instead, it merely stands for the proposition that
there can be no estoppel where there has been no detrimental reliance or injury. The
Bahrs make much of the fact that, in Barnard, the vague legal description of the disputed
parcel was equally within the knowledge of both mother and son. But the son's
knowledge was merely probative of the fact that he had not relied on his mother's
statements, and thus could not establish a prima facie case of detrimental reliance; it was
not fatal to his claim in and of itself. The Bahrs thus grossly misinterpret Barnard by
assuming that its facts somehow create a requirement for wrongdoing or actual
knowledge, when the facts were simply relevant to the ultimate issue of detrimental
reliance. It is telling that the Bahrs include a lengthy block quote from Barnard that
omits the actual holding and substitutes ellipses for the statement that the son "was not
damaged thereby," which was the crux of the case. (Appellants' Br. at 46.)
Accordingly, Barnard is inapposite in this case and does not support the contention
that Utah law requires superior or actual knowledge. And comparing Barnard to the
present case shows that the Imuses have met any requirement that Barnard could possibly
represent. Whereas in Barnard the defendant did not make any affirmative representation
upon which the plaintiff relied, in this case the Wymans represented that they would treat
the fence as the true boundary line. Unlike Barnard, where the plaintiff claimed he relied

upon the defendant's implied assertions regarding the legal sufficiency of the terms of the
oral contract, the Imuses do not contend that the Wymans made any representation
regarding the location of the true boundary line. Rather, the representation the Imuses
relied on was the representation that if the Imuses built the fence in the agreed location,
the Wymans would treat it as the true boundary line. Finally, whereas in Barnard the
plaintiff did not demonstrate any damages or detrimental reliance, the Imuses expended
the costs for the fence, installed their landscaping, irrigation, and sheds and located their
eastern boundary fence based upon the Wymans representation that they would treat the
western Boundary Fence as the true boundary line.
To the extent that the Bahrs are requesting the Court to make new law and impose
an independent requirement for superior knowledge, the Court should refrain. Again, the
existing elements of equitable estoppel are more than adequate, and, for the same reasons
as those stated above with regard to wrongful conduct, there is no need to impose such
additional requirements.
The Bahrs have not appealed the prior holdings that the three existing elements of
estoppel were met. But to the extent that the Bahrs appeal could be viewed as a request
for the Court to review the application of facts, there is more than adequate evidence to
affirm. Again, the Bahrs made the same arguments regarding superior knowledge in their
first appeal, and the court of appeals dismissed this argument summarily, noting that "[i]t
is not credible that neighbors of twenty years would lack knowledge of improvements
made along the separating boundary fence, especially when a tree growing along the

boundary fence precipitated the present
the court, further lound dial ii 11 iln know lul'T mid in IHHI . nl lln A\'\ 111,i™is fiir Bains'
predecessors in lilli thai ."enemies the Imuses' claim of equitable estoppel." Id.
Despite such direction from the court of appeals, the Bahrs continue to ignore that
the knowledge and affirmative action of the W yinans lies at UK Dean .., .
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equitable esioppci i Hamuli mi in pailus \\\ IV hnlh iiiicniiiiiii irj^iidini.1 ilir pin is*1 lin .ilnni
«4 (lit1 phlled hmnHilary line, and the Wymans represented that they would treat the fence
as the true boundary line if the Imuses paid for and helped the Wymans to construct the
fence
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-= addition the Wymans undoubted!} knew that, based upon this representation
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jiii'ii! iiiiHiis .until lulu II u improve the proper b c i it the Iiiii ises' side of

} msu knew that the Imuses agreed with their neighbor to the east to build

an eastern boundary fence in a location that was based up* HI the Wymans' representations
regarding the western Boundary fence, giving up properH thai IiLeh caimnl tri« |>

later asserted." Dahl, 2004 U I ' App 391 a. :H * ,,
And, even though the Wymans' actions are more than enough to justify estoppel,
the Bahrs' actions,, too, support the same conclusion Al fin Inin flit" B.ilit i purclms* J
theii pi opert} the} w erefi illy a;v are of the e xistence and location of the fence. They were
further

aware

that the Imuses occupied, claimed, maintained, and improved the prop? rr

i vm
i (lie Imuses 5 side of the fence.4 The Bahrs have further testified that VIIJK they
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suspected or believed that the fence did not mark the true boundary, apart from allegedly
expressing this suspicion to the Imuses, they never took any action to determine whether
that was the case, or to prevent the Imuses from using, improving, or occupying the
property east of the Boundary Fence.5 The Bahrs may have complained to Sandy City
and eventually obtained a survey, but not until nearly 15 years after the Bahrs acquired
their property. (R. 650-651.) The Bahrs' actions, too, show "a failure to act that is
inconsistent with a claim later asserted." Dahl, 2004 UT App 391 at \ 14.
Furthermore, it would be inequitable to reward the Bahrs for making their
inconsistent claim. The Bahrs got exactly what they believed they were purchasing when
they acquired their property; they have not lost anything. If they were allowed to succeed
on their inconsistent claim, the Bahrs would receive a windfall, receiving extra land that
they never bargained for. Brenda and Brent Wyman, the original owners of the Bahrs'
property, have even testified that, based upon their agreement with the Imuses, they
believe it would be inequitable to allow the Bahrs to succeed. (R. 223, 242.)6 At the
same time, the Imuses would be stripped of their improvements and punished for trusting
in their neighbors' representations. Because the Imuses have satisfied each of the three

51:12.
R. at 760, 65:7-12; 731, 26:10-21.
6
The Bahrs have previously contended that the affidavit testimony of Brent Wyman
should be disregarded because, by inadvertent mistake, an executed copy was not filed.
But if a party opposing summary judgment fails to move to strike a defective affidavit,
"formal or evidentiary defects in [the] affidavit... are waived." Pinetree Assocs. v.
Ephraim City, 2003 UT 6, Tf 19, 67 P.3d 462, 465. The Bahrs did not object to this
mistake in Brent Wyman's affidavit until on appeal. In any event, even if Brent Wyman's
affidavit were disregarded, Brenda Wyman's affidavit remains uncontroverted.
5

established elements of equitable estoppel, this Court should, affirm
TTT

PROPERTY ON I HEIR SIDE OF
THE BOUNDARY FENCE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY

T H E IMUSES A R £ ENTITLED T O T H E

AGREEMENT
If, for any reason, the Court is unable to affirm, based on the theory of equitable
estoppel, 'then the Court should affirm,, the award of summm, i»,w;_ii,*.iii ;M ^^
boundai y by agreement. "Wiiilr I lie In

i

* ' <* . '

ii|.»?vemriil ill 11, w Hi v\ illnn IIK purview of this Court to affirm based on such a theory.
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from.
"if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be
• he basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground •"
UK-or\ is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lo< i
• --• .M i ii -io n.^t i-(Mi*si<liM- u\ nr nnssr \ on bv the lower court.
Bailey - Bavhs, 2002 UT 58, \ 10, 52 l\3d : 158 (quoting Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 I IT
61, ^[ 18, 2^ V >il ' 225); see also Salt Lake County v. Metro West /V« au\ \it» hu
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r-41aic court may affirm if "the facts as
found by the trial court are sufficient to sustain, the decision of the trial, court on the
alternate ground " Id. at * ^0 \i the thcorv of iMUindm .^ agreement was fully hricled
to Ihe Inal court, llncie w
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facti lal findings ai e si ifficient to sustain the application of boundary by agreement.
Furthermore, if consideration of boundary by agreement is necessary, judicial
economy is best served in full resolution by this Court I Jncertaiiity regarding the

elements of boundary by agreement make decision by this Court most economical.7
Namely, this Court should clarify (1) whether there is a time requirement for boundary by
agreement, and (2) whether boundary by agreement requires objective uncertainty. After
clarifying the elements of boundary by agreement, this Court can easily apply the trial
court's findings of fact with regard to those elements.
Although it is rarely litigated because of the difficulties in showing an agreement,
the basic elements of boundary by agreement are easily stated. Longstanding Utah law
establishes that "when the location of the true boundary line between two adjoining tracts
of land is unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof may, by parol agreement,
establish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and their grantees."
Hummel v. Young, 265 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1953).
The undisputed facts found by the trial court establish the necessary elements for
boundary by agreement. Specifically, undisputed fact no. 2 establishes that there Imuses
and Wymans were adjoining landowners; undisputed fact no. 3 establishes that was an
uncertain boundary; and undisputed fact no. 2 establishes that there was an agreement
between the Imuses and Wymans. Based on these findings of fact, the Court can affirm
the award of summary judgment based on boundary by agreement. (R. at 1186-88.)
In light of such undisputed facts, the Bahr's arguments contesting boundary by
agreement rest on two propositions: (1) that boundary by agreement requires a twenty
year period of acquiescence, which has not yet been established as an undisputed fact and

7

See Mem. Decision at 3-4, R. at 1189-90 (recognizing uncertainties in elements).

(2) that to be "uncertain/' a boundary line must be uncertain on the face on the under ly ing
deeds conveying tl le proper ties at issi ic
A.

I he Court Should Not M a k e a Period of "Acquiescence" an Element
Necessary to Establish Boundary by Agreement.

Admittedly, there is authority suggesting that a long period of acquiescence is
required to establish a claim under boundary by agreemenl
( cr/> i <H V ?i\ <' > " Vo.| 11 iiijiii |*» ' -i i
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ix the Court deems it necessary to reach boundary by agreement, it
should fake this opportunity In resolve conflicts in this case law arui disavow such a
requiremtrii. AV.J*;,, *;
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^Ublish bounda? • lvi- ^quiescence,

period of acquiescence is or should be necessary to establish a boundary by
1

n o such
agreement.

Boundary by Agreement Is Already a Restricted Doctrine and
Policy Considerations Do Not Support Imposing a n Additional
Element for a I ,ong Period of Acquiescence.

I j ! HI mli <i tin-on In til perspective, there is no justification for requiring a pericu _
acquiescence as a separate element of boundary by agreement. The doctrines of boundary
by agreement and boundary by acquiescence each "identily circumstances in n b n U
l.iiiJih nil is iiiiii \ LliliJi huhndcii \ limii . v ill oiil ii u i ild mi i s • ni 11 i i N ill
685 P 2d 500, 503 (Utah 1984) overruled on other grounds byStaker

lliil/adavi'

v. Ainsworth,

i'lntf
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P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). As originally conceived, the t wo doctrines "were easily
1

'~"i:iguishable because bounoai % oy agreement req.i..wd an express pan., agrccnu

:

required a lengthy period of acquiescence but no express parol agreement." Halladay,
685 P.2d at 504. These different requirements reflect both the differing legal rationales
for the two doctrines, and the different situations they are designed to address.
The doctrine of boundary by agreement sounds in contract and is intended to
permit the fixing of boundaries by unwritten agreement without running afoul of the
statute of frauds. Brown v. Milliner, 232 P.2d 202, 207 (Utah 1951); James A. Backman,
The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Needfor an Adverse Possession
Remedy, 1986 B.Y.U.L.REV. 957, 963 (hereinafter "Backman"). Under the boundary by
agreement doctrine, "if the location of the true boundary is not known to the adjoining
owners, a parol agreement between them fixing its location is not regarded as transferring
an interest in land, but merely determining the location of existing estates." Brown v.
Milliner, 232 P.2d 202, 207 (Utah 1951). Accordingly, such an agreement does not
violate the statute of frauds, and it is enforceable against the parties and their grantees.
However, because "sufficient proof of an agreement is often difficult to come by,"
and the "doctrine of boundary by agreement is [accordingly] not often invoked," the
courts developed the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to fill "an important gap in the
law." Stoker, 785 P.2d at 508. This "gap" exists where there is no proof of an express
parol agreement, yet adjoining landowners have "occupied their respective premises up to
an open boundary line visibly marked . . . for a long period of time and mutually
recognized it as the dividing line between them." Brown, 232 P.2d at 207. In order to
"prevent strife and litigation concerning boundaries," and to preserve "peace and good

order," in such cases "the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located."
Brown, 232 P.2d at 20 ) ; Stakei ,' ) 85 I " 2d j it 508.

proving the "agreement" to the boundary line. In boundary by agreement cases, the
agreement is proven by evidence establishing an actual parol contract. In boundary by
acquiescence cases, the agreement .-> .,;-./•*.: -

yresumeJ

InM'tl upon llic i

Whereas a long period of "acquiescence" is necessary in boundary by acquiescence cases
to justify "implying" an agreement, no such acquiescence period is or should be required
when the cour t is presented with direct pre
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963 96 7.
Despite the clear difference between these doctrines, the distinction between them
has blurred over time, and "[i]n various opinions the Court even referred to boundary by

I!" 2d at 5133 One of the conseqi lences of this improper bh irring is the suggestion that a
long period ofacquiescen.ee is required for boundary by agreement. Hobson, 530 P.2d at
794. But imposing such a requirement "eikcuvely removes a majoi diMiuuu»ii between
II ni i ni i ui IL ni ni i I n . t i ' j T P i r i i n i t
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g en eral time requirement in boundary by agreement." Backmanat 963-964.
Additionally; from, a policy perspective, there is no need to establish an

independent element for a period of acquiescence. 1 lie primary element of boundary by

agreement, that an agreement is proven, is sufficiently restrictive to prevent abuse of the
boundary by agreement doctrine. The number of cases in which the original landowners
will be available (if they are even living) and able to provide a consistent recollection of a
binding oral agreement, as they are in this case, have been and will continue to be very
limited. Given this, there is no policy reason to require a showing of mutual acquiescence
for any period of time.
2.

Imposing a Long Period of Acquiescence Fails the Test of
Common Sense and Undermines the Viability of Boundary by
Agreement as a Functional Doctrine.

The impact on existing legal theories of requiring an independent period of
acquiescence further illustrates why such an element is unnecessary and inappropriate.
Simply stated, imposing such an element would necessarily render the doctrine of
boundary by agreement meaningless. If a long period of acquiescence is required,
boundary by acquiescence would swallow boundary by agreement. The following table
aptly illustrates the comparison of elements, if accepted as stated in the Staker footnote.
Boundary by agreement
"Boundary by agreement, premised on a
contractual theory, requires "(1) a n
, agreement, (2) between
adjoining
landowners, (3) settling a boundary that
j was uncertain or in dispute, and (4)
executed by actual location of a boundary
line.' In addition, Utah requires mutual
acquiescence for a long period of time.
! Staker, 785 P.2d at 423 n.4 (quoting
Backman at 963).

Boundary by acquiescence
"[T]he doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence included four factors: \l) \
occupation up to a visible line marked by 1
monuments, fences, or buildings, (2)
mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary, (3) for a long period of time, (4)
by adjoining landowners.'" Staker, 785 !
P.2d at 420 (quoting Goodman v.
Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447,448 (Utah 1981)).

(1) an agreement

=

NONE

(2) between adjoining landowners

_

(4) by adjoining landowners
NONE

(3) settling a boundary that was uncertain
or in dispute
{4} executed b1- '»ptu'»i i.w *»ti*\ti t\C ••
bouriuan line.
"Ir. aiMihon \ ;.ih requires mutual
acquiescence for a long period of tune."

i

_.

(1) occupation up to a visible line marked
ay monuments, fences, or buildings
(2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary . \V) for a long period of time
I

In N»h 1 <-•• circumstance, the only distinction between the tuo theories would be tlui j- der
boundary by agreement, a party must meet all ol Use ^ lements of boundary by
ac<
boundary was uncertain or in dispute. Since relief could be obtained by simply satisfying
the less demanding standards of boundary by acquiescence, there would be no purpo- <M
ever pleading or seeking to prove boundary by agreement if the fifth element of "11111 ltual
at quiCM nice foi .i limr pciind nil Inm

i, n11|Mist'tl Nut 111 i it quiii'mcnl

,|

mini lendi r

bound."". u*. -v-'recmenl entirely moot, impotent, and lifeless.
i he (\>uri Kss tve<' ofx-i^ eufl^-.fl of the "intermingling of the two related
doctrines'" ' and asserted that it "has been the source of considerable conf usion and

502-503. In addressing this confusion, the Court criticized the "intermingling" of the
elements of boundary by acquiescence and boundary" by agreement, calling it "unfortunate
in its impact " ' and by its holding, indicated that the doctrines should not continue to be

that the Court clarify that boundary by agreement does not have a separate element
requiring a long period of acquiescence.
3.

Tracing the Supposed Requirement for a Long Period of
Acquiescence Demonstrates the Flawed Logic of Such a
Requirement

The primary justification for imposing an element of acquiescence in boundary by
agreement is the 1975 case of Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp. There, the Court held
that, to establish "boundary by acquiescence or agreement," there must be acquiescence in
a boundary "over some substantial period of time." Hobson, 530 P.2d at 794. The
Hobson decision, however, misconstrues prior precedent.
In that case, a purchaser (Hobson) obtained a large tract of undeveloped land.
Hobson met with the husband of an adjoining landowner (Mrs. Marsden) and purported to
locate, by using a hand-held compass, the boundary between Hobson5s land and the
parcel retained by Mrs. Marsden; Hobson then constructed a fence marking such a line.
Six years later, Mrs. Marsden conveyed the adjoining parcel, and one year later,
Panguitch Lake purchased this adjoining parcel. Hobson, 530 P.2d at 793-794.
Panguitch Lake obtained a survey, concluded that Hobson's fence was encroaching, and
removed it. Id. Hobson brought suit to enforce the boundary. Id.
The Court refused to hold that there was a boundary by agreement Rather than
simply address the situation according to the existing elements (i.e. base its decision on a
lack of an express agreement or a lack of uncertainty), the Court made a fatal mistake,
asserting that under Utah law, Hobson must have demonstrated acquiescence in the

boundary "over some substantial period of time.' Hobson, 530 I"l, 2d at' ) 9 1 ' 1 1 le Com i s

intermingling of the doctrines discouraged by the Court in Staker.
First, Hobson correctly quoted Brown v. Milliner for the proposition that "it has
long been recognized in lliis state that when tiic location oi the true boundary between
hi", i» iiilfiiiHin'iitfi, Inn 11 ol 1 ill KI I. i mi ill mi \ ii inn i mi I ;i in i on mi ill i pi ili I lie o\\ inns fhnvot in i\
"• ** »rol aereemeni, establish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves
and their grantees " Hobson, 530 P 2d at 794 (quoting Brown. 23? P 2d at 206). In an
attempt to Jisim^ui -ii U.i > iiwivi.s.^, liu . u,<.son court assc;U:u ; i.i: ;- own was inapposite
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p e r i o c l of more than 60 years." Hobson, 530 P.2d at 1{J ..
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Hobson court then went on

to explain thai such .* period ofacquiescen.ee was necessary in "boundary by acquiescence
or agreement" because ti..
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In asserting that Brown was inapposite because a sixty year period of
acquiescence, Hobson not only misstated the facts (Brown actually found that there had

grown

court

fc£ I10t t r e a t boundary b)r acquiescence and boundary by agreement as

interchangeable doctrines which both required a long period of acquiescence. Rather;, the
Brown court treated the doctrines as two distinct theories, with different elements.

In fact, Brown explained that boundary by acquiescence was an alternative theory,
where "in the absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining property or their
predecessors in interest ever expressly agreed as to the location of the boundary between
them, if they have occupied their respective premises up to an open boundary line visibly
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings for a long period of time and mutually
recognized as the boundary between them, the law will imply an agreement fixing the
boundary as located." Id. at 207. Brown further distinguished the two theories by noting
that while boundary by agreement required "uncertainty or dispute," no uncertainty in the
original boundary line was required to establish boundary by acquiescence. Id. at 208.
Applying these theories separately, the Brown court found that there was inadequate
evidence of either an agreement supporting boundary by agreement or acquiescence in a
visible boundary establishing boundary by acquiescence. Id. at 208-209.
The Hobson court simply failed to recognize the distinctions between boundary by
agreement and boundary by acquiescence and, as the Court later held in Stoker,
improperly treated "boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence as if they had
merged into one." Stoker, 785 P2d at 422 (specifically criticizing Hobson). Indeed, the
Stoker court expressly decried "the intermingling" of the two doctrines exemplified by

o

Indeed, the Hollodoy court recognized that under the court's holding in Brown, the two
doctrines were "easily distinguishable because boundary by parol agreement required an
express parol agreement with respect to a boundary but no period of acquiescence, while
boundary by acquiescence required a lengthy period of acquiescence but no express parol
agreement." Id. The Hollodoy court further recognized that Hobson departed from this
established law by imposing "the requirement of a long period of acquiescence" to claims
based based on "boundary by agreement." Id.

Hobson as "the source of considerable confusion and controversy among judges, lawyers
and landowners.' " ;" < i" Stake? made it c k ai that ii iten i lingling u

* ;• •

I fobsc n i) w as it: i ipi oper as it w 01 Udresi ill: in rendering one of the two doctrines "lifeless."
Id.

I 'he Hobson decision represents a deviation from the greater body of Utah boundary

law. Accordingly, Hobson should not be the foundation for a separate element of
acquiescence ii i boundarj fay agreement.
B.
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Objective Uncertainly Is INol am E l e m e n t of B o u n d a r y by A g r e e m e n t

Boundary by agreement requires that when the agreement was made, "the local ion
of the true boundary line between two adjoining tracts oi i.tmi j u . n j unknown, uncen ni>
{

>< - -ln*\ a?LV!-"i

below that this element should be construed to require "objective uncertainty," as that
term,, was used in Halladay

v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). The Bahrs make this

argument despite the fact that, after considerable controversy, ttuumiay
specifically because of its objecti v e uncer ta;Iiit; - approacl

was over-ruled

-i

Moreover, even if'Halladav had not been over-ruled, the Bahrs reliance on it
would still be ml.spl.aced

Halladay was a boundary by acquiescence case-—not a

boundary by agreement case—and the cases relied on b \ * «I««M.....
nh|crln iMinnT< : m | ^'' t ^ i » m | 'ihhH 4 M iNHimLtn h\ \\\\\uw\i
Whitney, 209 P.2d 257 ^Liiah 1949); Madsen
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v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981). Indeed,

no. Utah, court, has i:\ ci held that an "objective uncertainty" standard applies to boundary
by agreement, ar\

-1^ Court certainly should not extend the doctrine now

At most, the Bahrs can argue that the Court should adopt a standard of "objective"
uncertainty for boundary by agreement for the reasons discussed in Halladay. But for the
same reasons as those expressed in Stoker, the Court should not adopt such a standard.
There, the Court considered, in depth, the relative merits and failings of an "objective"
uncertainty standard. The restrictiveness of that standard, effectively requiring a mistake
in the granting deeds, ultimately persuaded the Court that Halladay should be overturned, despite the concerns of stare decisis expressed by the dissent in Stoker. In the
present context, with no concerns about stare decisis, there is no justification for
extending the standard to boundary by agreement.
As articulated in Stoker, "the Halladay requirement of objective uncertainty makes
boundary by acquiescence less practical, further restricts what was already a restrictive
doctrine and effectively eliminates boundary by acquiescence as a viable doctrine for
settling property disputes in Utah." Stoker, 785 P.2d at 423. The Court further noted that
"[fjhe result of Halladay and its progeny has been to convert a doctrine that was
originally predicated on the policy of settling boundaries" into a doctrine that "serves as a
basis for challenging boundaries not founded on recent survey information," causing an
"increase [in] litigation over boundaries rather than [a] decrease." Id. If a standard of
objective uncertainty were imposed in boundary by agreement, then the same words
would ring true with regard to that doctrine.
If necessary, the Court should clarify that "objective" uncertainty (as outlined in
Halladay) is not a requirement for proving the elements of boundary by agreement.

Having done so, the Court may easily apply the undisputed facts to the uncertainty
element and affirm llic dial i ouil ; aw aid ol si urn i i;na s judi'mcnl ba.si d un undisputed li.irl
]
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irties did not know the precise location of the "boundary line

between their properties." (R. at 1187.)
The trial court's finding is well supported by available evidence. I he I111
original siaieniciii ml h a s suites iliiii |h|eeause u was nni ileal

hue (lie jetunl

be i indar> line was located, at the time the Boundary Fence was built, we agreed with the
Imuses that the fence marked the boundary between our respective properties." (R. at
464, f 5.) This fact is supported by the aHida\ its ol
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arm hio.s VWman and

I\ Iel( Mi.ee ai id Jim Imus ;. (I : i it 218; 223; 229; 250.)
. i wihr • - /•• r-onded by asserting that "[t]he "W ymans and Imuses believed 'they
knew where the proper boundary line was between their respective properties based upon
wood stakes located in the back ol iheu properties ami ma,-kuit: pins in im iioni * , \\w\r
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m support ui their contention, the Bailie cited portions uA the

deposition testimony of Melodee and Jim Imus, specifically to the deposition of Melodee
Imusal }/ I MX 'I 4!
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These deposition excerpts support, rather than contradict, the trial court's
. ^" j Miied fact m ~. that "the parlies did nol know the precise location of the boundary
MHV hetween tueu i-jwpcriic^.
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hese excerpts icinioiv-e m*. w>nclusion that

the Imuses and Wymans did not know where the true boundary line was. No one ever
conducted a survey, and the focus of the neighbors' measurements was to make sure that
each of the Daltons, Imuses, and Wymans had 80' each between their respective fences.
Indeed, these excepts tend to show that Brent Wyman actually thought he was getting
more land than he was entitled per the plat description, as he measured more than 80'
across his back line. (R. at 711, 34:13-35:14.)
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Imuses respectfully request that the Bahrs' appeal be
denied and the decision of the court of appeals affirmed.
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